Putin-Pashinyan’s Phone Conversation Confirmed Russia’s Interest in Armenia and the Caucasus

Putin-Pashinyan’s Phone Conversation Confirmed Russia’s Interest in Armenia and the Caucasus_Kavkaz Files_SpecialEurasia

Kavkaz Files ISSN 2975-0474 Volume 31 Issue 2
SpecialEurasia OSINT Unit

Executive Summary

The recent phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reviewed Armenia’s presidency of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and outline future cooperation within the bloc.

Drawing on local and international sources and SpecialEurasia’s monitoring activities, this report examines Moscow’s efforts to maintain its influence in Armenia through the EAEU amid growing Western engagement and regional instability. The report explores the implications of this dynamic for regional power structures and expects potential scenarios stemming from Yerevan’s developing alliances.

Background Information

On January 17th, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a phone conversation to review Armenia’s presidency of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and outline future cooperation within the bloc. Started by Armenia, the discussion focused on energy integration and the advantages of its EAEU membership.

The phone conversation followed a series of events which positioned Yerevan closer to the West: on January 9th, 2025, Armenia officially approved a draft bill to start its EU accession process. On January 14th, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Affair Minister Ararat Mirzoyan launched the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission.

Following Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia is reassessing its alliances and security strategies, thus shaping its foreign policy decisions.

Geopolitical Context

Armenia occupies a critical position in the South Caucasus, a region where geopolitical interests converge. Moscow has traditionally viewed the Caucasus as a vital component of its blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad) and lebensraum (vital space), leveraging organisations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to maintain its dominance. However, Armenia’s increasing Western alignment signals a potential fracture in this dynamic.

The September 2023 Azerbaijani offensive further exposed Armenia’s vulnerabilities, including the limitations of Russian security guarantees under the CSTO framework. Because Moscow seems to favour Baku and Ankara, and the Ukraine conflict has significantly influenced the Kremlin’s foreign policy, Yerevan sees it as a less dependable security ally.

Armenia’s pivot towards the West reflects a broader strategic realignment. Its deepening relationship with the EU could yield economic benefits, including enhanced trade relations and potential visa liberalisation agreements. The U.S. presence also emphasises the South Caucasus republic’s significance in the balance of power against Russia and Iran. Washington’s financial and military aid seeks to bolster Yerevan’s resilience, aligning its governance and security practices with Western standards.

This shift presents a challenge to regional stability. With the West now involved in Armenia, Russia and Iran’s efforts to limit Turkey’s power in the South Caucasus face a new challenge. Azerbaijan’s strengthened position, underpinned by military successes and alliances with Ankara, exacerbates the fragility of the regional balance.

Armenia’s foreign policy decisions could inspire similar moves among other post-Soviet states, particularly those seeking alternatives to Russian-led frameworks. However, such shifts will likely invite significant pushback from Moscow, which regards the South Caucasus as integral to its regional strategy.

Why Does It Matter?

Armenia’s reorientation carries profound implications for all involved actors. For Russia, Yerevan’s Western pivot threatens its standing in the South Caucasus, undermining the EAEU and CSTO’s credibility. Moscow may intensify its diplomatic and economic engagement with the post-Soviet republic to counter this trend, as evidenced by recent high-level discussions between Putin and Pashinyan. By the way, as several regional experts noted, because of limitations stemming from Ukraine conflict, Russia cannot unilaterally reassert its dominance.

For Washington and Brussels, Yerevan represents a strategic opportunity to expand influence in a region historically dominated by Moscow. Western actors are likely to deepen their engagement through economic incentives and security cooperation. Although this strategy could help stabilise the country domestically, it might provoke Russia and Iran, who perceive Western influence as a challenge to their regional power.

Iran and Turkey will also respond to Armenia’s shifting alliances. Tehran and Moscow share an interest in counterbalancing Ankara’s influence, but diverging priorities may complicate coordination. Meanwhile, Turkey could leverage Azerbaijan’s successes to strengthen its regional foothold, potentially destabilising the South Caucasus further.

Future scenarios hinge on the South Caucasus republic’s ability to navigate its developing alliances. A full withdrawal from the EAEU and CSTO would signal a decisive break with Moscow, intensifying geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus.

Alternatively, Yerevan may adopt a hybrid approach, seeking to balance Western partnerships with limited engagement in Russian-led frameworks. In either scenario, the regional power balance will remain volatile, with significant ramifications for the broader Eurasian geopolitical landscape.


Picture: A meeting between Nikol Pashinyan and Vladimir Putin (Credits: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

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