Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 50 Issue 4
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi

Executive Summary

Sayfiddin Tajibayev’s appointment to a senior position in the Syrian Ministry of Defence highlights a serious security risk to Tajikistan and Central Asia. This development could catalyse the movement of more extremists from Central Asia to Syria, facilitating the establishment of new foreign fighter networks and training centres.

These fighters, equipped and trained under the new Syrian defence apparatus, may ultimately return to their home countries intending to destabilise local governments.

This report analyses the implications of Tajibayev’s role, with a focus on the risks posed to Syria, the Middle East, and Central Asia’s stability.

Key Takeaways

1. Sayfiddin Tajibayev’s appointment could encourage Central Asian extremists to travel to Syria to establish or join new training centres or terrorist groups.
2. Trained and equipped fighters returning from Syria pose a heightened threat of destabilisation within Tajikistan and other Central Asian nations.
3. The presence of Tajibayev in Syria symbolises a growing link between foreign militant leadership and Central Asian extremist networks.

Sayfiddin Tajibayev in Syria:
Information Context

On January 3^rd, 2025, Tajik bloggers close to Hay’at Tahir al-Shams posted on their social media pages that Sayfiddin Tajibayev had become the newly appointed commander of Qaid Amaliyat fil-Livo, or head of the Operational Headquarters in the emerging new Syrian government’s Ministry of Defence.

Tajibayev, a former commander in Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, has a history of recruiting Tajik citizens for militant activities. His appointment reflects a strategic effort by Syria’s transitional government to incorporate experienced foreign fighters into its defence structure, reportedly assigning six of fifty senior defence roles to non-Syrian militants. This decision raises concerns over the militarisation and legitimisation of extremist leaders within state institutions.

Tajikistan’s domestic security challenges, including political repression, ethnic marginalisation, and economic instability, provide fertile ground for extremist ideologies. The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) remains vulnerable, as the marginalisation of its ethnic minorities fosters resentment and susceptibility to radicalisation. Tajikistan’s government has long struggled to counter the appeal of groups such as the Islamic State, whose propaganda efforts include publications in local languages, including the recent Tajik version of Voice of Khorasan.

The possibility that Tajibayev’s leadership could draw more Central Asian extremists to Syria increases regional instability. These militants could establish training centres or foreign fighter networks, further enabling the spread of terrorist activities. Following repatriation, these individuals pose a potential threat to governmental stability, a phenomenon observed in previous conflicts.

Given the volatile geopolitical landscape of Central Asia and the Middle East, marked by the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s fall, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to the Taliban’s resurgence, the ramifications of Tajibayev’s actions transcend Syrian borders and might fuel future jihadist propaganda.

Risk Scenarios

Tajikistan and Central Asia

• Impact of Returning Fighters: Central Asian fighters returning from Syria may utilise their combat experience to build clandestine support networks within Tajikistan, complicating law enforcement efforts and providing logistical or financial backing to extremist cells.
• Propaganda and Recruitment: Ideological radicalisation through propaganda glorifying Central Asian foreign fighters could lead to increased recruitment and sympathisers, intensifying security challenges across the region.
• Cross-Border Threats: Tajikistan’s proximity to Afghanistan facilitates cross-border movements, potentially enabling cooperation between extremist groups in Afghanistan and Central Asia, sharing resources and expertise to strengthen their operations.
• Exploitation of Local Grievances: Returning militants might exploit socio-economic discontent, particularly in regions like GBAO, to galvanise local support for anti-government activities, further destabilising the area.
• Regional Implications: Fighters could target vulnerabilities in neighbouring states, prompting a regionalisation of their activities. This could lead to increased reliance on external powers for security, undermining regional sovereignty and cohesion.
• Potential Cooperation: As a counterbalance, Central Asian states might respond by enhancing regional collaboration on counterterrorism, fostering stronger security integration and resilience against shared threats.

Syria

• Inclusion of Foreign Fighters: The transitional government’s incorporation of foreign fighters and jihadist organisation members into its defence apparatus raises questions about their allegiance and intentions, risking internal divisions and instability.
• Challenges to Government Credibility: The presence of individuals with extremist affiliations risks undermining the transitional government’s credibility internationally, complicating diplomatic efforts and reducing global support.
• Internal Military Conflicts: If these fighters pursue personal or ideological agendas, it could lead to confrontations within military ranks, weakening the chain of command and hindering stabilisation efforts.
• Resurgence of Terrorism: Internal divisions and instability within the Syrian military may foster an environment ripe for the resurgence of terrorism, thereby jeopardising regional and global security.
• Diplomatic Complexities: Foreign fighters might challenge the government’s direction or legitimacy hinder Ahmad al-Shara’s attempts to foster dialogue with actors like Turkey, Russia, and.

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