Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 50 Issue 1
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi
The shifting dynamics in Syria and the Middle East have forced a reconsideration of strategies among key players, including the Russian Federation. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the ascension of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have created a new geopolitical landscape, challenging Russia’s long-term objectives in the region.
To acquire deeper insights into Moscow’s developing strategy amidst these changes, a few days before the end of the year, SpecialEurasia had an exclusive conversation with Alexander Hoffmann, a Military Adviser from the Russian Federation. His analysis sheds light on the Kremlin’s military, diplomatic, and strategic recalibrations, offering a comprehensive perspective on Russia’s current and future approach in Syria and the broader Middle East.
Because of Assad’s fall, Russia lost a key partner in the Middle East. How can the Kremlin adapt its strategy in the region?
“First of all, many experts wondered what would happen to the 720th logistics point of the Russian Navy in Tartus, the airbase in Khmeimim, and other military facilities outside the Latakia governorate. After the regime change in Syria, Russian forces and assets outside the province were pulled to Latakia. We saw on one video that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militants stoned a Russian convoy, but overall, this troop redeployment to Latakia was incident-free, meaning Moscow had agreements with the new authorities in Damascus on the security of the contingent and its movements in Syria.
As for Russia’s military presence in the Arab republic, the Tartus site allowed for the provision of a grouping in Syria, while the Khmeimim air base allowed for the use of combat aircraft at the tactical level in operations inside the country. There have been assessments in the Western expert and analytical community that Russian military facilities in Syria gave Moscow the ability to project power in the Mediterranean or even in the entire “Euro-Atlantic theatre of operations.” In my opinion, these assessments are exaggerated considering Russian forces and assets in Syria were small and operations were limited to the Arab Republic.
In addition, Moscow is currently preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits are inaccessible for naval movements (with some reservations). Russian warships will inevitably travel to or from Syria around the European peninsula – the Baltic and Barents Seas – if not even through the Suez Canal if we are considering routes between the Mediterranean and Pacific Fleet bases in the Far East. This lengthens the contingent’s supply lines in Syria, but not critically enough to force Russia to abandon its military presence in the country. It is not as onerous as military support for the previous Syrian authorities.
This is a rough picture of the military aspects and how the Kremlin can adapt to the changing political situation in Syria. The military presence in this country is often solely associated with the Russian strategy in the Middle East. And from this it is concluded that if Russia’s contingent leaves the Arab republic, Moscow’s position in the region will weaken. However, Russia does not have the same concentration of military forces and capabilities in the Middle East as the United States with its Central Command. The Kremlin is not interested in military control over this region.
Moscow’s position in the Middle East did not emerge out of nothing with the formation of a military grouping in Syria in 2015. They are based on many factors, among which military power is far from the main one: permanent membership in the UN Security Council, food security issues, harmonization of policies in the energy market, new geo-economic routes such as North-South and many others – they existed before 2015. These components of Russia’s strategy in the region are static and much more long-term. Accordingly, the Kremlin will continue to rely primarily on them.
The military presence of Russian troops, in turn, is support for local governments that are allied with Moscow. Such a scenario is possible in Africa, where a number of Sahel countries face threats from terrorist and separatist movements.”
Some Russian commentators and bloggers have expressed disappointment with the Russian strategy in the last days. Could Assad’s fall undermine Moscow’s reliability with its regional partners?
“In the first days of the militants’ offensive from Idlib, there were emotional assessments of what was happening. Western observers even painted a picture of Russia’s “humiliation”. After three weeks, we see that the Russian contingent is still in Syria.
As already mentioned, against the backdrop of the priorities of the conflict in Ukraine and the inability of the previous authorities in Damascus to reach an agreement in the country, military assistance to the government of Bashar Assad has become increasingly burdensome. The capabilities available to the Russian contingent in the country would have sufficed for sensitive strikes against militants in Idlib. But no action was taken by Moscow.
If we look at the diplomatic moves of the three parties to the Astana format – Iran, Russia and Turkey – that were made between November 27 and December 8, we see that their actions on the Syrian issue were devoid of any sudden movements. Yes, there were incidents, such as the attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus, but on December 7, the three countries actually reconciled their positions on the situation in Syria in Doha before the Arab republic changed its flag the next day.
I would like to emphasise that this happened on the margins of the XXII Doha Forum. Among the geopolitical factors that contributed to the Syrian crisis were two competing gas pipeline projects to Europe – Qatari and Iranian. They are actually connected with the same super-giant field, which is divided between Doha and Tehran – North Dome/ South Pars.
Behind the multidirectional political rhetoric of Iran, Russia and Turkey, it is most likely that there were already agreed arrangements on Syria. If it did not reach the wider public in the region (because it was not conveyed to them) or the Western expert community (because it has to stick to its political conjuncture in dealing with public opinion), it does not mean that the governments, diplomatic bodies and intelligence services of the Middle Eastern and Western countries are not aware of the situation. Therefore, in the Middle East, the reliability of relations with Moscow is viewed on the basis of long-term interests, not on the basis of comments on social networks or biased expert opinions.”
In the last years, HTS was designated as a terrorist organisation according to the Russian law. How could Moscow maintain its presence on the Syrian coast considering the proximity of HTS and other terrorist groups? Is there the risk that HTS rise will push other terrorist organisations to challenge Moscow?
“The reasons why this organisation was recognised as a terrorist must be understood. First, it was formed from other terrorist and extremist groups that were operating in Syria. Second, when Russia was providing military support to the Assad government, the HTS was a military adversary. The second reason is outdated, but the first is not. There is precedent with the process of removing the Taliban from the list. However, the Taliban did not commit terrorist attacks against Russia.
As already mentioned, Moscow has reached certain agreements with the HTS on the security of the Russian contingent in Syria. This is impossible without stable channels of communication between the parties. In all likelihood, they were built and maintained much earlier than December 8.
By the way, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s (HTS leader) own brother Maher has been working quietly and safely in the Russian city of Voronezh as a doctor for the past few years.
The most sensitive point, in addition to support for Assad and combat experience, is the presence of Central Asian and North Caucasian militants in the ranks of the HTS who are extremely hostile to Russia and their governments in Central Asia. If neutral Georgia becomes hostile to Russia again, they will have direct transit through Turkey and Georgian Kakheti to Russian Dagestan – Tsumadinsky, Tsuntinsky and Tlyaratinsky districts. In addition, they will have an open platform to announce their religious and political goals and propaganda in the North Caucasus.
The elimination of this threat is likely to be crucial to building relations between the Kremlin and the HTS if the latter manages to hold on to power in Syria.
At the same time, American and, in particular, British experts in the early days of the HTS offensive from Idlib suggested negotiating with the group or other terrorist organisations in Syria to attack Russian military facilities in the country in order to “humiliate” Moscow. Various Tom Clancy-inspired scenarios were put forward, including Ukrainian maritime drone strikes on Russian ships in a false-flag operation, but in the end, as we see, the HTS did not take such action. But this does not mean that, for example, the British intelligence services will abandon such attempts. For them, the Russian military presence in Syria, judging by the rhetoric of British military analysts, is a very painful issue that gives them no rest. Therefore, the risk of terrorist attacks against the Russian contingent concentrated in Latakia remains.”
What happened in Syria could have undermined the relations between Moscow and Ankara?
“Russia and Iran have lost their former role in Syria, which is now dominated by NATO member Turkey. However, further development of the situation in the Arab republic promises no less serious problems for Ankara: security, migration, economic impact and so on. It is not enough to win; it is more important to hold on to the results of the victory.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s policies are highly opportunistic, both in their internal and external aspects. This has been demonstrated repeatedly in relations with Moscow after 2016. As long as Ankara remains a member of the North Atlantic alliance, it cannot be completely frank with Moscow on defence and security issues. At the same time, Turkey is interested in economic opportunities and multilateral cooperation, which are frowned upon by Washington and Brussels. Perhaps this balances its relations with Russia.
It should be understood that Ankara’s external partners are also predicting what will happen after Erdogan and whether Turkey’s policies will be the same after him. Especially if his domestic political opponents gain power.”
From the military point of view, how was possible that the Syrian rebels gained easily ground and conquered the major cities with no real confrontation with SAR forces backed by Russia?
“Representatives of the Syrian Defence Ministry’s Military Intelligence Directorate (Shubat al-Mukhabarat al-Askariyya), with whom I was in contact, cited that their Armed Forces were exsanguinated by crisis and war in the early days of the HTS offensive. That is partly true, but even so, the Syrian military had the strength and capabilities to repel the attack. But the commanders saw no signals from the allies, and the Assad government limited itself to soothing rhetoric.
In Russia, there is a popular catchphrase “All is quiet in Baghdad,” which comes from the Soviet fairy tale movie “Aladdin’s Magic Lamp” (In the United States., there is a similar expression from the Civil War era – “All Quiet Along the Potomac”). It symbolises an inadequate response to real threats. In the same way, the Syrian Ministry of Defence made statements that “All is quiet in Damascus” while the military units of the armed forces were laying down their weapons, leaving the cities and the enemy was approaching the capital of the republic.
As stated earlier, it is highly likely that such a scenario was pre-arranged and the Syrian forces did not offer serious resistance to the HTS. Those who disagreed with this left the country, in particular – went to Iraq.
It is worth noting that representatives of the Syrian military almost immediately lined up to swear an oath to the new authorities and began to prove their loyalty – including by exposing their comrades-in-arms. This says a lot about the real morale of the Assad government’s Armed forces.”
*In picture: Russian airbase in Syria (Credits: L-BBE, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons)
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