Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 49 Issue 1
Author: Antonio Graceffo
For over seventy years, the people of Burma have fought relentlessly against successive military juntas that have ruled the country with an iron fist, striving for democratic change.
Since the 2021 coup, this struggle, once spearheaded by ethnic minority militias, has expanded to include the Bamar majority and city dwellers who have organized themselves into People’s Defence Force (PDF).
Despite their combined efforts and numerous victories, including seizing control of approximately 70% of the country’s territory, the junta’s military, the Tatmadaw, continues to cling to power, bolstered by critical support from Russia and China.
China’s Interests in Myanmar
China has heavily invested in Burma through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This corridor provides China with access to critical raw materials and energy while also addressing strategic goals. A planned rail link from Yunnan to a Chinese-built port, Kyaukpyu Deep-Sea Port, on Myanmar’s coast along the Bay of Bengal, would grant Beijing direct access to the Indian Ocean, a highly coveted aim for Xi Jinping.
This direct access to the Indian Ocean presents significant security concerns for the United States and its ally, India. An increased presence of Chinese People’s Liberation Navy (PLA-N) ships in the region could threaten both nations’ strategic interests. The CMEC would also help China resolve its “Malacca Dilemma,” securing an alternative route for Middle Eastern oil imports. Currently, the Strait of Malacca serves as a critical chokepoint for China’s energy supply. In the event of a war over Taiwan, the U.S. could blockade the strait to cut off China’s access to oil. CMEC, however, would enable Beijing to bypass this vulnerability entirely.
Additionally, China’s direct access to the Indian Ocean would not only secure its energy supplies but could also place it in a position to interfere with global shipping routes that pass through the region, increasing its influence over international trade. The dual-purpose nature of CMEC highlights the broader geopolitical stakes of China’s deepening presence in Burma.
China’s support of Myanmar’s military junta is a direct assault on the country’s democratic aspirations. Despite Myanmar’s economy and currency collapsing under the weight of war and international sanctions, the junta remains afloat because of Chinese economic and military backing. If Beijing were to withdraw its support, the war could end, paving the way for the establishment of a civilian government and democratic elections. However, Beijing focuses more on ensuring stability to protect its investments than promoting democracy or peace.
To achieve this, Beijing has continued to “bet on the junta,” expecting the military regime to stabilise the country under its rule. However, since the launch of the joint rebel offensive on October 27th, 2023, Beijing appears to be hedging its bets. It has engaged with several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to secure its interests, regardless of the war’s outcome. Despite this shift, the bulk of the Chinese support remains directed toward the junta, reflecting its preference for a regime that prioritizes Chinese interests over the will of the Myanmar people.
This troubling partnership was on full display on November 6th, 2024, when Chinese Premier Li Qiang met with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing during the Greater Mekong Subregion summit in Kunming, China. During the meeting, Li pledged to support Myanmar in its “political reconciliation and transformation,” signaling diplomatic endorsement of the junta’s proposed elections. However, the international community widely views these elections as a sham, designed to exclude genuine opposition and democratic voices while giving the junta an appearance of legitimacy.
Following the military coup in 2021, the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) implemented stringent registration laws that effectively barred major pro-democracy parties, such as the National League for Democracy (NLD), from participating. The Union Election Commission dissolved the NLD, led by ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and arrested or exiled key political opponents. Only political parties approved by the UEC may participate, and these new laws require re-registration under conditions deemed unacceptable or impossible by many pro-democracy groups. Furthermore, ongoing violence and repression have made it difficult to complete an accurate census, further undermining the credibility of the process. Consequently, the junta has refused to approve any significant pro-democracy or resistance parties. This has led to widespread criticism that the elections lack legitimacy and inclusivity, guaranteeing the junta’s continued control.
China’s actions are exacerbating Myanmar’s already dire humanitarian crisis. Over 4 million people have fled the country, and over 3 million remain internally displaced, lacking access to food, medicine, housing, or physical security. Many are forced to hide in the jungles, where they face the dual threats of starvation and government airstrikes.
In October 2024, China closed its border with Myanmar, cutting off critical supplies like food and medicine to civilians and resistance forces in northern border areas. This calculated move has further isolated vulnerable communities, intensifying their suffering and effectively aiding the junta’s brutal suppression of dissent. Far from being a neutral security measure, the closure mirrors the junta’s infamous “Four Cuts” strategy, which aims to deprive resistance forces of resources and undermine public support.
China’s interference in Myanmar goes beyond economic policies and border closures. In August 2024, Beijing reportedly pressured the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—one of the most well-equipped and organized ethnic armed groups in Myanmar—to cease its support for other ethnic armed groups and revolutionary forces, including the People’s Defense Forces (PDF). While the UWSA has maintained a ceasefire with the junta, largely due to its heavy reliance on trade with China, Beijing is now attempting to prevent the UWSA from supplying weapons to pro-democracy fighters.
Leaked documents reveal that China threatened to cut economic and development assistance to the Wa region if the UWSA refused to comply. These tactics expose Beijing’s broader goal of undermining Myanmar’s resistance movement while ensuring its own influence over the country’s internal affairs.
By propping up the junta, China might be considered complicit in the ongoing atrocities committed against Myanmar’s people, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide. Despite being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, obligated to uphold international peace and security, China is using its influence to shield the junta and advance its own agenda.
The United States, the EU, and other Western democracies have imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s junta but have been hesitant to take the next step of implementing secondary sanctions against China for its support of the regime. Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) in exile, along with many ethnic armed organizations and much of the civilian population, would likely welcome U.S. or international military intervention—or at least military assistance similar to what is being provided to Ukraine. However, the West remains understandably cautious about becoming entangled in a foreign conflict in a remote region with limited knowledge of the terrain and dynamics.
Conclusion
Given these challenges, the most effective way to support democracy in Myanmar may be to target China with secondary sanctions. Cutting off the flow of cash, weapons, and jet fuel to the junta could significantly weaken the military regime without the risks associated with direct military intervention.
Unlike military involvement, which some fear could escalate the conflict, economic sanctions offer a less risky yet impactful means of saving lives and pressuring the junta. The sooner the fighting ends, the sooner the people of Myanmar can stop dying and begin the process of rebuilding their nation with freely elected leaders.
Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of SpecialEurasia.
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