Kavkaz Files ISSN 2975-0474 Volume 26 Issue 4
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi
President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to the North Caucasus highlights the Kremlin’s ongoing strategic interests in a region that remains pivotal to both Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.
Despite the challenges that have persisted since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, including the central government’s struggle to assert control over the local population, the North Caucasus today presents a different landscape compared to the turbulent 1990s and early 2000s. However, recent events, such as the terrorist attack in Dagestan and the involvement of North Caucasian fighters in the Ukrainian conflict, signal potential threats to Moscow’s authority in the area.
To acquire deeper insight into the region’s dynamics, the developing situation, and future risks, SpecialEurasia engaged in a discussion with Mairbek Vatchagaev, a historian and political analyst specialising in the North Caucasus. Vatchagaev, who served as a senior official in Aslan Maskhadov’s Chechen government, provided a comprehensive analysis of the current state of affairs in the region.
How do you assess the current situation in the North Caucasus compared to the situation 20 years ago? Is it true, as Moscow always claims, that the situation has improved, or do the same challenges and problems of the past still exist?
“It is unwise to draw sharp, unequivocal conclusions about the situation in the North Caucasus, given the significant diversity of the region. The region itself varies greatly internally—from the strongly pronounced separatist sentiment in Chechnya to the completely “indifferent” attitude toward this idea in the republics and regions in the Northwest. When discussing separatist ideas in the region, it is crucial to acknowledge that this is neither a well-coordinated nor widely embraced discourse within society. We are dealing with groups that are not currently united by a common idea or a unified structural connection.
Today, there is no organised Islamic underground in the region, unlike what we observed in the 1990s and the early 21st century. It is also important to remember that almost all of these movements arose directly from the situation in Chechnya, under the influence of Chechen forces striving for independence. These forces had been active since the 1980s (initially underground, later coming into the open, taking advantage of M. Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost). Meanwhile, in the republics neighbouring Chechnya, we saw national organisations that were based on the ideology of protecting and promoting national interests, but with no aspirations of existing outside the framework of Russia.
But if Russia has achieved its goals, why does it still maintain additional military and police forces in the North Caucasus region? Why are all regions of Russia (from Kaliningrad to Khabarovsk) still required to send their special forces and police units on six-month deployments to Chechnya and neighbouring republics? Why does Moscow not trust the population in these republics to elect the head of the republic (except for Chechnya, no region has the right to elect its own leader)? Why such absolute distrust towards the local peoples?
The entire problem with those who rule Russia today is that they realise that even the slightest weakening or any sign of weakness at the federal centre could spur the activation of groups seeking to achieve certain concessions from Moscow (at least in the initial stages). This could eventually lead to movements towards special rights for one nationality or another.
Can we say that the former armed underground has not affected the youth in the region? I would not be so categorical. The fact that young people are proud of their actions, use their images as avatars, sing nasheeds (Islamic chants about those who died in the holy war—jihad), participate in numerous Islamic groups on various social networks, and immerse themselves in a deep understanding of the fundamentals of Islam from radical theologians, suggests that it is far from over.
I would say that everything has transformed into a different state—instead of weapons, knowledge in Islam; instead of rallies, participation in groups that express the views of yesterday’s militants in the region; instead of suicide bombings, a constant struggle exists on social networks against those who discuss the future of Russia. In other words, today it is harder for Russia to fight against those who fought with weapons 20 years ago. It is harder to fight against those who now fight with their minds rather than weapons.
Today, Moscow is repeating the same mistakes that were made during the Soviet Union, which means that we should expect an escalation in the region from forces demanding radical changes, most often under the guise of a religious agenda.”
When discussing Chechnya, the Western media often focus on the strict rule of Ramzan Kadyrov in this North Caucasian republic. What is your opinion about Chechnya and its future?
“It would be beneficial to pose questions about this to everyone who studies Chechnya and the North Caucasian region as a whole. One of the first questions is why, after the end of hostilities (which, according to the Russian version, concluded in 2009), more military and police units were created in the republic than anywhere else in Russia?
Why does a Chechen occupy the position of head of government when it would seem more logical to appoint a representative from Moscow, as had been the practice since Chechnya’s forced inclusion into the Russian Empire in 1859 and until the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Until then, Chechnya was exclusively governed by appointees from Moscow and St. Petersburg—anyone but Chechens (in 1989, for the first time, a Chechen, Doku Zavgayev, was appointed head of the regional Communist Party Committee).
Why has the myth of the Chechen leadership’s impunity not only in the republic but on a federal scale been created and maintained? Why does Moscow turn a blind eye to Kadyrov’s actions when no other leader of a Russian region could even dream of doing what Kadyrov does?
Such questions suggest that the situation in Chechnya is not as simple as the federal centre would like to portray it. The fact that there are so many questions that need answers indicates that the situation requires explanation. In reality, there is no uncontrolled autonomy for the Chechen leadership—nothing happens in Grozny that Moscow disapproves of. The idea that Kadyrov is independent, strong, and capable of nullifying Russia’s achievements in the republic is a myth.
By handing over control of Chechnya to Kadyrov, Moscow understood that it would have to turn a blind eye to many things, including fundamental principles of its own constitution. Although the presence of the constitution in Chechnya is hard to imagine in practical terms, it does not exist in the daily lives of Chechens. It functions solely to cover the legal flaws in Chechnya’s reality. No one would think of defending their opinions or dignity based on Russian laws because they mean nothing in the republic. Only one law applies here—the law of Kadyrov. Thus, as in the Soviet era, problems are solved outside the state apparatus, with attempts to regulate matters without involving the state and negotiating with the state in exchange for minimal harm. This is what the communists encountered during the Soviet era, failing to understand the structure of Chechen society. Today, with a Chechen at the helm of the republic, he understands how it works, and it benefits him in his game with the Kremlin.
Another myth—why have over two hundred thousand Chechens settled in Europe? In reality, active military actions involving the destruction of villages and towns practically ceased in 2001. Were these refugees connected to the military resistance of Ichkeria? It would be hard to imagine that their numbers could exceed two thousand fighters! In fact, the flow of Chechen refugees to European countries is more related to the desire to leave the country in search of a peaceful life, where universal laws that protect a person’s honour and property are enforced (at least, that is how European countries appear from a distance). They did not flee to other Russian regions (a common, naïve question in refugee offices in European countries!) because they did not feel protected by the laws there. Russia is a unitary state, and there is no protection in its regions from persecution in other parts of the country. Their choice was deliberate—they chose European democracy, which, while certainly not perfect, is far better than what Russia offers. This is not about idolising European civilisation; it is about selecting the best option available as they left Chechnya and Russia.
We are not even talking about those who remained in Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries, a figure that could be around one hundred thousand, if not more. Additionally, there are at least one hundred thousand Chechens living permanently outside their historical homeland in Russia (mainly in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Siberia, etc.). Several tens of thousands reside in Central Asian countries (mainly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). Thus, approximately one in four Chechens lives outside Chechnya. Whether or not this is significant will become clear over time. However, it is this diaspora abroad, which Kadyrov initially tried to forcefully bring back, that creates many problems for him in asserting his main thesis—that all Chechens, regardless of where they live, support him not only as the head of the republic but also as the leader of all Chechens.
It is unrealistic to depict all those living abroad as supporters of Ichkeria. There is also political pluralism in this matter, ranging from supporters of Ichkeria to supporters of Kadyrov. Additionally, there is a third force—an Islamic vector among those living in Turkey and the Middle East. But the main misconception is that there are only three political forces, as mentioned above. In fact, the vast majority of Chechen emigrants adhere to a principle of political neutrality. It is for this group that all three politicised factions of the diaspora (Ichkerians, Islamists, and Kadyrovites) are competing.
No serious independent sociological research has been conducted in recent years, making it difficult to draw far-reaching conclusions about those living in Chechnya today. We can only assume that their views are similar to those of the emigrants, but we lack objective research today. The studies I managed to conduct among students in 2015 (through online surveys and in cooperation with local university professors) indicated a trend of radicalisation among Chechen youth studying outside of Chechnya and Russia (Chechen students from universities in Moscow and Saratov were surveyed). The further students were from their historical homeland, the more radical their views were about the future of their homeland and the policies pursued by Chechnya’s leadership.
In other words, we have a situation that cannot be objectively assessed by sociologists independent of government influence and pressure, which allows for much speculation about the situation in Chechnya. The population cannot express their opinions (dissent) about the actions of the republic’s leadership; any unsanctioned gatherings or actions perceived by the authorities as oppositional are immediately and harshly suppressed. Arrests or persecution are not limited to opposition-minded individuals but also extend to a wide circle of their relatives to exert psychological pressure on those who try to express opinions contrary to the official policy of the republic’s leadership.
Therefore, it is important and necessary to study the opinions of Chechen society through the lens of large-scale emigration. This emigration is not free (as everyone understands that their relatives at home will be pressured by the Chechen authorities), but it is not as subject to persecution as it is at home, in the historical homeland.
However, there is progress: for the first time in over twenty years, since Chechens moved to European countries, they have begun to create their own political parties. There are already four such parties today (Democratic Party, Voice of Chechnya, United Force, and Zakayev’s Movement of Political Forces). People are beginning to get used to the idea that participating in a protest will not always be met with violence from Kadyrov’s men, and that European laws, although not always, can provide them with protection.
Chechnya remains practically the only republic within Russia where the desire to live in a future outside of Russia is not only the highest but also absolutely dominant in the consciousness of various categories of people (not always implying a return to Ichkeria; discussions also consider various paths for a new Chechnya, often comparing it to the Emirates, Qatar, and other Middle Eastern countries). This allows us to discuss a high level of activity and the potential for decisively taking their fate into their own hands, as happened during the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Such conclusions are drawn based on analyses of numerous Chechen chat rooms, forums, and channels. Unlike all other peoples of the North Caucasus, no one is asking how they will live outside of Russia—the question is what an independent Chechnya will look like.”
Recent events in Dagestan have highlighted that terrorism has not disappeared in the North Caucasus. Do you think the region could face an increase in violent attacks in the future? Could you tell me why?
“I would view the events in Dagestan, the attack on the church and synagogue, not only in the context of terrorism, but also in the light of the high level of anti-Semitism denied in Russia and abroad by some experts on the North Caucasus. Many experts specialising in the North Caucasus look at the problems of the Republic of Dagestan through “rose-coloured glasses” because they communicate with the same interviewers. If in relation to those who stormed the airport in Makhachkala on October 29th, 2023, and protested against the landing of a plane with Israeli citizens fleeing the war, the consequences would not have been as tragic as they became with the armed attack on religious sites of Jewish and Christian worship on June 23rd, 2024 in Makhachkala and Derbent.
In fact, the authorities themselves prompted the anti-Semites to tighten up. The authorities, having placed their bets on one side in the conflict in the Middle East, wanted to show how the country supports the Palestinians and condemns the Jews for their country’s policy against the Muslim population of Israel. They indulged their obvious goodwill towards the angry crowd. The authorities saw leniency towards the demonstrators as a sign of tacit consent, if not explicit endorsement. Only after the murder of a priest and the arson of a synagogue in Moscow did they realise the situation could get out of control, and they began to massively imprison the participants in the airport’s storming. The situation in the region is changing here, too, unlike in the past, when the major factor was the position of nationalist leaders, now everything is changing rapidly under the influence of the Internet. Today, residents are more concerned about Israel’s actions in Palestine, and against this background, for the first time, Dagestanis took action against the Mountain Jews, who were considered one of the peoples of the republic and an integral part of them (according to the constitution of Dagestan, they are one of the autochthonous peoples of the republic, although incorrectly designated as Tats).
The pressure that was exerted in the region by the events in Syria and Iraq (from 2011 to 2019) is being replaced by permanent actions against Muslims in the world. After Syria, now occupied by the Palestinians, there will be something else that will set the local population against new enemies.
Are these actions accidental? Numerous articles consistently emphasise the unique nature of Dagestan compared to other republics, highlighting its cultivation of a multicultural society and the enduring influence of Soviet-era patterns. Today, the world dictates the terms in the Internet space. Here, young people and athletes, without the opportunity to openly receive answers to their pressing questions, learn from Internet preachers who mislead them and put them on the path of extremism. It was not the mosques in Dagestan that taught them to attack the church and the synagogue, and the police. They (the extremists) believed in their correct decision precisely because of what they learned on social networks and Telegram channels. Not trusting their mentors in mosques and societies, they became servants of those who call for jihad on the Internet. The worst thing is that such an action by extremists does not lead to alienation, but on the contrary, the youth accept their actions as an example. Therefore, we should expect such actions in the future. After all, they understand their actions will not change anything, nevertheless, they go unarmed against the police, kill a priest who never in his entire life said a single bad word not only about Dagestanis, but also against anyone in general. They do this in exchange for an afterlife, which allows us to discuss a low culture of self-education. It is necessary to talk a lot and everywhere about the culture of Islam, about those heroes who have become an example of behaviour in world history. It is necessary to clarify that the enemy is not the one who serves the church and the synagogue, but those who, in the name of the authorities, limit them in their ordinary rights as citizens. The bitterness that pushes one to murder, although a criminal-psychological product, has reasons, a specific addressee and performer, described best by Dostoevsky.”
The Kremlin has launched an Islamic banking project in four republics (including Dagestan and Chechnya). The Kazan Russia-Islamic World Forum often highlights how the Muslim population has become strategic in Moscow’s domestic and foreign policies. How do you assess the current status of religious freedom in the North Caucasus? Is the government’s presence in religious institutions too strong?
“Since September 2023, banking operations based on Islamic banking, which involve lending (not only) based on Muslim law – Sharia, have officially started in Chechnya and Dagestan (as well as in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). It is assumed that the amount of money accumulated in the cardholder’s accounts will not be serviced by other money from Russian banks. All banks that have received permission to operate in this line have received fatwas in two languages - English and Russian, which specifically state that the bank will conduct operations exclusively based on Sharia. Interest in credit and debit cards of this type of banking is still small. Not everything is as rosy as it may seem at first glance. The fact is that the bank has only conducted operations in three positions so far – opening an account, issuing a card, and opening a mortgage. For some reason, the mortgage in an Islamic bank turned out to be higher than in all-Russian ones, which is why people are not drawn there yet. The fundamental problem is the lack of personnel to work in this area, which at first will limit its rapid spread in the regions and among Muslims in other regions of the Russian Federation.
People are also confused by another fact: Islamic operations will be conducted by the same Russian banks that are given permits to work in regions where the Muslim population lives. For example, in Chechnya, the Russian Sberbank uses such a license.
This option for Muslims is a kind of concession to the increasing number of Muslims and an attempt to appear before the Islamic world as a country that supports not only Muslim culture.
As for the Kazan Forum, organisers aimed to hold it in Tatarstan, a Muslim republic with a thousand-year history of Islam. That is, against the background of contradictions with Western countries, Russia is ready to make certain concessions that would not be accepted under other conditions, and is trying to get the countries of the Islamic world as allies. And in this direction, it has had some success.
The Islamic world, despite its theses, controls its own Islamic organisations, not to mention those who speak on behalf of Islam at the state level. The issue of separating the state and Islamic institutions is practically out of the question in any Islamic country where Islam is proclaimed the only religion practiced in the country.
The situation with Islam in Russia is approximately the same. The authorities coordinate their work with all elected muftis. Not a single mufti in the history of the Russian Empire, later the Soviet government, and in today’s modern Russia has been able to pursue a policy independent of the state. In practice, his role is to speak and lead his ummah (Muslim community) in the spirit of the law and the Kremlin’s policy.
In large cities of Russia – Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov, Krasnodar, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and many other cities, Muslims, because of a lack of mosques, pray in the snow, in the rain, in the heat, in the open air. We are talking about a shortage of several thousand mosques in the country. The authorities do not give permission. In Russia, the population is not only wary of those who profess Islam, but sometimes expresses hostility, as during protests against the allocation of land for the construction of a mosque in the Moscow region or in Kaliningrad. Women in hijabs are prohibited from attending lectures at universities, girls in headscarves are not allowed to attend classes at school, and much more, which makes the overall picture of Russia a strange ally of the Islamic world.
In the North Caucasus, relatively free expression of will on Islamic issues remains in two regions – Dagestan and Ingushetia. There are still mosques here that are associated with those who are commonly called Salafis. There is no confrontation between Sufis and Salafis, nor there is any pronounced antagonism. In other subjects of the North Caucasus, there can be no talk of the presence of a Salafi mosque, just as it is impossible for Salafis to express their opinion on Sufism or approve of the policies of the local leadership.
Muftis have no authority among the population, this applies to both Ingushetia and Dagestan, as well as other subjects. For the population, they are officials dressed in the robes of a mufti. There is no Islam in Russia outside of power, it is fully integrated into all structures and controls, not allowing the population to become radicalised, which is generally not within their competence.”
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