Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 45 Issue 4
Author: Maryam Fattahi Manesh
While the leaders of the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham put themselves on fire to maintain their last stronghold in Idlib province in western Syria, the process of social changes is not progressing as the group expects, and the signs of chaos and people’s protest against the security and economic situation is increasing day by day.
This issue has made the northwest of Syria susceptible to important developments in the near future. In this report, we will first discuss the current situation of this region, then we will introduce and provide brief information about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In the end, we analyse the future of this region.
The Current Situation in the Northwest of Syria
The northwestern region of Syria is currently part of the opposition and Takfiri groups (accused of being apostate or infidel) and the other part is occupied by Turkey.
Between 2018 and 2019, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham took control of an area that included the entire province of Idlib, west and south of Aleppo, north of Hama and parts of Latakia, this area is also known as the “Great Idlib”. Idlib is very important for Turkey and the Russian navy in the Mediterranean Sea.
In fact, after a series of bloody clashes with other local opposition factions, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was able to consolidate its authority over the majority of the region and take control of the main roads, border crossings with Turkey, as well as the front lines with the central government.
According to the statistics of the United Nations northwest of Syria has a population of about 5 million people. Of these 3.6 million internally displaced, and 1.9 million living in camps and self-settled sites. Approximately 80% are women and children who are particularly vulnerable to many risks, including sexual and gender-based violence. Also, according to the 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), it’s estimated that around 2.1 million people in northwest will need shelter support and 1.1 million will require Non-Food Item (NFI) support.
After more than 13 years of conflict and civil war in Syria, the humanitarian situation in the northwest of this country continues to deteriorate due to the continuation of hostilities and conflicts, the worsening of the economic crisis and the consequences of the devastating earthquake in February 2023.
Now rising anger within the senior ranks of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham at the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani has deeply shaken the organisation in recent weeks, posing the most substantial threat to the group’s leader in years. Following a months-long campaign of arrests against hundreds of the group’s members, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader is facing growing pressure from an array of dissenting his commanders.
A short history of the activities and governance of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham in Syria
As one of the terrorist and takfiri groups active in the Syrian war, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was created on January 28th, 2017 from the merger of several Salafist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra. HTS is the branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria, although this group has declared that it has no connection with Al-Qaeda. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham consists of other groups such as al-Zanki, Lawa al-Haq, Fath al-Sham Front, Ansar al-Din Front, and Jaish al-Sunnah. Of course, Nuruddin Zanki’s movement later separated from this organization and joined the “Tahrir Front of Syria” along with some other groups.
This group participates in terrorist attacks including suicide bombings, kidnapping and hostage-taking. The US State Department considers this group a terrorist organisation. They have fought against the Syrian government, the Free Syrian Army, ISIS and various other groups in the conflict. According to the Brookings Institute, this group had 7,000 fighters in 2017. However, according to the estimate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, this group had between 12,000 and 15,000 fighting forces at the end of 2018.
Among the 1786 cases of violent incidents attributed to HTS between March 2017 and August 2018, 99 cases were violence against civilians and the rest were related to Iranian fighters, ISIS fighters and fighters supporting Bashar al-Assad. The peak of this violence was from October 17 to November 17, 2017, when 338 violent incidents were committed by this group in just one month.
Between 2017 and 2020, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham continued to strengthen its military and political hegemony in Idlib and its surrounding areas. By 2020, Ahrar al-Sham and Huras al-Din had militarily defeated their main rivals in Idlib, established key government institutions in Idlib province, and survived several attacks led by the Syrian central government.
In January 2019, HTS took control of Idlib province by expelling Assad’s opponents, especially groups supported by Turkey, from Idlib, and now in 2024, it dominates parts of Idlib and the crossings of this province to Turkey. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s monthly income from crossings is estimated at around 13 million dollars; but this amount does not include the Bab Al-Hawa crossing on the border with Turkey, this crossing alone earns about 40 million dollars a month for Tahrir al-Sham, which means that their total monthly income from the crossings reaches about 53 million dollars.
According to reports, another source of their income is from taxes and duties they impose on citizens under their control, such as the provision of utility services (electricity, water, or utilities), renting properties seized from the Syrian government, moving goods, and imposing tariffs on weapons.
The group also received private donations from wealthy individuals in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait during 2013-2016, according to data from the Counter Extremism Project. Their weapons come from stockpiles seized from the Syrian government or from rival groups after clashes. According to reports, it is very easy to buy small arms and ammunition in the Idlib region.
Regarding recruitment methods, HTS has recruited fighters through its online media channels and in-person efforts to recruit local people. They have recruited the largest number of foreign fighters after ISIS, in September 2018 between 3,000 and 4,000 foreign fighters were members of this group. According to UN statistics, they used 187 children until December 2018.
Between 2017 and 2020, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham continued to strengthen its military and political hegemony in Idlib and its surrounding areas. By 2020, Ahrar al-Sham and Huras al-Din had militarily defeated their main rivals in Idlib.
It established key government institutions in Idlib province and survived several attacks led by the Syrian central government against rebel-held areas in Idlib. As of June 2021, analysts believe that they are not only the most powerful takfiri group in Idlib province, but also possibly the most powerful non-state opposition group in Syria.
The Future Perspective of Northwestern Syria
Popular demonstrations in Idlib against Abu Mohammad al-Jolani have continued in recent months, which seems to have shaken the foundations of his leadership. According to local sources, many cities and towns of Idlib witnessed demonstrations demanding the overthrow of al-Jolani, including the center of Idlib and the cities of Jasr al-Shughur, Banish and Jericho. These demonstrations included the cities of Kafr Takharim, Sarmadeh, Maarat Masrin, Haram and Taftnaz, in addition to Attarab and Abyan Samaan in the outskirts of Aleppo.
Some of the banners held by the demonstrators read: “Jolani slaughterhouses are damaged inside and out”, “We will continue our revolution to remove the last veil”. Demonstrators also raised slogans and banners, the most important of which was: “We want an independent and impartial judiciary where the strong will be judged against the weak and the leader against the soldier.”
The fate of the Idlib ,in addition to the internal developments of this region, depends on regional and international actors: Turkey, Russia, United States and Iran. Turkey, even though the country’s military presence in Idlib is now confined to observation posts, an unofficial non-aggression pact with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and an entente with Russia, it still plays a dual role as guarantor and mediator.
Iran wants the return of the central government’s sovereignty over all areas of Syria, and ideologically, it has no compatibility with the jihadist groups based in Syria. Russia wants the jihadists based in Idlib to be destroyed and is worried about Chechen fighters returning home. Due to Idlib’s neighborhood with Latakia, the opponents based in Idlib have organised several attacks against the Russian bases in Tartus and Hmeimim. To eliminate such threats, Moscow must consolidate and stabilise the restoration of Syrian sovereignty over the territory. The Astana process gave Russia the opportunity to present itself as a global power with the ability to negotiate and resolve regional disputes without the intervention of Western actors.
On the other hand, Ankara’s association with Washington, while expanding the influence of the two from Deir Ezzor in the east to Latakia in the west, affects Moscow’s strategic interests in the Mediterranean coast of Syria.
Turkey and Syria do not share enough common ground to normalise ties. Yet their interests align sufficiently to enable certain trade-offs when it comes to the regions lining their shared border. This is particularly true of the northwestern region. Meetings between Turkish and Syrian regime officials are ongoing. Bashar Assad and Erdogan are supposed to meet directly in one of the border areas in the next few weeks.
The calculations are highly complicated. The areas the two sides are negotiating have been shaped by the war. All the demographic, security, and economic factors are an embodiment of the war’s impact. What may occur is a series of security and economic understandings over parts of the north west.
For Ankara, there is nothing left except the Idlib region: an area through which he can negotiate, bargain or apply pressure for the Kurdish issue. Second, Turkey will use it to bargain or exploit the issue of reopening the crossings or closing them to armed groups or refugees, and accordingly, Erdogan will try to preserve Idlib and keep it away from the control of the Syrian government.
Over the past years, Idlib has become an area where armed groups have entered from different parts of Syria and have concentrated there, and the last of these groups have gone to Idlib with the control of Aleppo by the Syrian army over the past years.
Considering the neighborhood of Idlib province with Aleppo and the proximity of this province to Afrin region, it is worrying for Turkey. Because this area is currently surrounded by the Turkish army and the borders of this country from the west and north. Therefore, for Turkey, Idlib province is the vital artery of this country’s security and stability in the region which in the absence of correct and accurate control, can lead Turkey to a complex security puzzle.
For Ankara, the future of this region is closely related to the developments in north-eastern Syria. If Turkey withdraws from Idlib and paves the way for the recapture of the Assad government, Ankara can get permission from Russia in the north east in return. If the Regime were to succeed in retaking the province, the last major rebel stronghold, this victory would essentially mark the end of large-scale, armed opposition within Syria
Conclusion
The situation due to the mass protests of the people in recent months has become difficult and complicated for the leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, especially Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani. The residents of Idlib is suffering from deep economic and social problems. The attacks of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Russia on different areas of Idlib continue and it seems that it will intensify in the future. The fate of north-west and north-east Syria is intertwined because common international and regional actors influence the trends and dynamics of this region and can deal with each other for different interests.
However, it is clear that Turkey, as the main beneficiary in these two regions, may sacrifice Idlib and the political groups active in it for its own interests in northeastern Syria, if relations with Damascus will be normalised. It seems that the situation in Idlib and northwest Syria will remain the same in a short period of time but any number of the scenarios may emerge from a deal between Ankara and the Syrian regime. These scenarios may include the adjustment of the borders of one or more parts of the northwestern regions, which could redraw the political map of northwestern Syria once again.
Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of SpecialEurasia.
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